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Adverse events and near misses arising from medical error is a concern in international 
emergency medicine, for both the in-hospital and out-of-hospital setting.  We noted a number of 
adverse events and near misses reported to an Emergency Medical Services Quality Assurance 
Committee in a resource-limited setting, and sought to establish the literature regarding 
preventable and non-preventable medical error in medicine, both in Sub Saharan Africa and 
internationally.   
Before we are able to act to implement recommendations to decrease both individual and 
system error, we need to record and report current demographics and trends.  The literature 
review that follows describes current ways of detecting, reporting, and trends in medical error 
reporting worldwide – especially in the emergency medical services located in resource-limited 
settings.   
The possibility of doing harm to the patients we treat is a fear of every conscientious medical 
practitioner. Some harmful outcomes, or adverse events, are unpreventable – a classic example 
of this is the patient with an unknown penicillin allergy who is prescribed amoxicillin for the 
first time. However, preventable adverse outcomes (those that would have been prevented, had 
the error not occurred in the first place) happen daily in every area of patient care. Preventable 
adverse events are by their definition due to error. (1) Detecting error is not always 
straightforward. System errors and various types of personal errors occur, and adverse advents 
do not necessarily result unless a few of these errors occur at the same time, and multiple 
systems fail to prevent the adverse outcome (holes in the Swiss cheese- model). In addition, 
even where errors are detected, they are often not reported, not spoken about, and not further 
investigated due to various factors, which we will be discussing in more detail. The fact remains 
that in order to prevent errors and the resultant preventable adverse outcomes, we need to know 
what is happening currently.  
The reported numbers of adverse events are high; so high that in fact medical error was recently 
estimated to be the third leading cause of death in the United States. (2) Emergency medicine, 
and especially the emergency medical services, is far more prone to error.(3–6) The 
unpredictable, fast-paced, distraction-filled environment lends itself to error constantly.(5,6) 
The effect is compounded in low resourced systems with their unique challenges. We cannot 
entirely eliminate error, but as we recognise the factors surrounding error and adverse events, 




The aim of this literature review was to describe an overview of the types of errors that occur, 
recommendations reported, and systems in place to detect, measure, and improve patient safety 
in low-resourced, emergency care settings.  
 
Methods and Search Strategy  
We conducted a search of PubMed, AfricaWide, and the Cumulative Index to Nursing and 
Allied Health Literature (CINAHL) using the following search terms: 
Emergency Medical Services OR prehospital care OR “out of hospital” care OR emergency 
health services OR ambulance* AND Adverse events OR safety management OR adverse 
occurrences OR iatrogenic OR error  
We excluded non-English articles, commentaries, letters to the editor, and abstract-only 
publications. Articles that predominantly discussed provider safety (for example ambulance 
accidents) were reviewed, but excluded from the discussion. Citations that involved combat 
settings were also excluded.   
Altogether 2951 references were retrieved. Most were excluded by title review. Articles deemed 
relevant were initially reviewed by abstract, and those considered for inclusion by reviewing the 
full article.   We searched the references cited by all retrieved articles, in order to identify 
additional potentially relevant publications.  Altogether 41 articles that related to patient safety 
in the emergency care setting were included in this critical review of the literature.  
 
Quality Criteria 
Articles were assessed by the authors using the Critical Appraisal Skills Programme (7) 
checklists. Each article was assessed for internal and external validity, including the presence of 
bias. Following this, each article was critically evaluated in order to assess whether or not the 
information could be applied to the local resource-limited emergency care setting.   
 
Definitions 
Error: The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of an incorrect 
plan to achieve an aim. (8)  
Adverse event: An injury resulting from a medical intervention, rather than the patient’s 
underlying condition. (9) 
Patient Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an 
acceptable minimum. (10) 
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Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that resulted in harm to a patient. (10) 
Near miss: an incident that did not result in the harm to a patient.  (10) 
 
Latent error: An error whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within the system for a 
long time, only becoming evidence when they combine with other factors to breach the 
system’s defences. (11) 
 
Cognitive error: An error in the process of thinking (11)  
 
Affective error: An error when there is an inordinate intrusion of affect into the decision-making 
process that results in a poor decision and may lead to a poor outcome. (11) 
 
System:  set of interdependent components interacting to achieve a common aim. These 
components may be classified in various ways: sociographic factors include national, 
organisational/institutional, health-care provider, and patient/family. (11)  
 
 
Patient safety and adverse events 
The most well-known and widely cited study related to patient safety is the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study (HMPS, 1984). (12) This extensive and well-conducted trial was the first of its 
kind. During 1984, 31,429 records were screened for adverse events (and whether or not they 
were caused by negligence) by using a validated process. Adverse events were defined as 
complications that arose from medical management rather than from the patient’s condition, and 
included both unpreventable events (an example is cited where a patient developed a 
deterioration in renal function after exposure to contrast during angiography) and preventable 
events (arising due to error, including negligence). The authors estimated that 3.7% of all 
patients hospitalized in 1984 in the State of New York sustained adverse events, and that the 
overall incidence of negligence was 1.0%. Extrapolated to the total number of patients 
discharged in New York in this year, they estimated a staggering 98 609 adverse events, of 
which 27 179 were due to negligence. Of these adverse events, 2.6% resulted in total disability 
and 13.6% resulted in death. Adverse events that occurred due to negligence were more likely to 
result in serious disability. (3,12) The authors noted possible sources of error in conducting the 
study, including missing records and the agreement and judgment of the physicians reviewing 
the records to identify the adverse events and/or negligence. (3,12) 
Thomas et al used a similar methodology to detect adverse events in the states Utah and 
Colorado in 1992, and found 459 adverse events during that time. When extrapolated to 
discharges in the both states, they estimated 16 609 total adverse events, with a total cost of 
over 650 million US dollars. (4) The results of both studies made the medical community take 
notice that adverse events and negligence were occurring regularly and that patient safety 
needed to be addressed. In 1999, the Institute of Medicine in the United States released its 
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landmark report: To Err is Human – Building a Safer Health Care system. (8) In its opening 
statements, it not only quoted the two studies above, but further extrapolated the data from three 
states to the entire hospitalised population of the United States in one year by suggesting that 
between 44,000 and 98,000 Americans could die every year as a result of medical errors. This 
exceeds the fatalities due to motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer, or HIV/AIDS. In Australia, 
a large multi-centre, two-phase trial, consisting of medical record review, revealed an overall 
proportion of admissions associated with an adverse event of 16.6%. (13) In 1979, Steel et al 
examined the medical records of 815 patients admitted to the medical wards of a university 
teaching hospital, and discovered that 36% had iatrogenic illnesses which reflect a higher 
number than estimated by the studies above.(14) Similarly to the HMPS, iatrogenic implied an 
illness that resulted from either a diagnostic procedure or any form of therapy. According to the 
authors, their methodology did not include negligence or culpability on behalf of the carers, or 
that the event was preventable. However, although it was a smaller study with less stringent 
criteria, the incidence of adverse events was higher than in the HMPS. (14) The authors of the 
Institute of Medicine report noted that the report underestimated the prevalence of error. (8)  
In 2013, in a review article of four more modern studies, James et al estimated that at least 
210,000 deaths per year in the United States result from medical errors.(1) The most recent 
estimate, based on studies published since the report, estimates the deaths per year in the United 
States resulting from medical error at 251,454. This ranks medical error as the third leading 
cause of death in the United States with only cancer and heart disease causing more deaths. (2)  
These figures are staggering and therefore disallow further complacency.  Unfortunately, the 
patient safety literature is limited in low resourced countries. The majority of data available on 
patient safety is based on chart review and single centre studies, particular topics such as 
transfusion, maternal morbidity, and paediatrics.(15) 
An interesting alternative strategy to detecting adverse events was described by Andrews et al in 
the Lancet in 1997.(16) Ethnographers experienced in studies of medical error attended ward 
rounds and meetings in three different units within at large urban teaching hospital.  These 
observers recorded all data mentioned about adverse events at morbidity and mortality 
meetings. Health care providers identified at least one adverse event (as defined by the 
researchers) in 45.8% of all patient admissions. These included events that did not lead to harm, 
and therefore according to our criteria would be defined as near misses. The authors noted that 
17.7% of admissions suffered serious harm as a result of an adverse event.  Some limitations of 
this study include that the observers were only present for discussions at ward rounds and 
formal meetings, and not for other discussions (or adverse events that have gone undetected). 
The authors believed that these results, although much higher than the HMPS, was still an 
underestimate of the true number of adverse events occurring. (16)  
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Adverse events in emergency medicine 
Intuitively we anticipate a high prevalence of error in emergency medicine. Factors such as high 
levels of diagnostic uncertainty, high cognitive load, multiple interruptions, shift work, 
inexperience, and poor feedback lead to multiple opportunities for error to occur. (17) 
Emergency medicine was not studied as a specialty in the HMPS, but when the authors 
considered the location within the hospital at which that adverse events occurred, only 3% 
occurred in the emergency centre. (The highest number of adverse events, 41%, occurred in the 
operating theatre.) However, a disproportionately high number of adverse events events due to 
negligence occurred in the emergency centre (70%) compared to other sites (41% in patient’s 
hospital room, 14% in the operating theatre). The authors surmised that, because not many 
highly invasive procedures were performed in the emergency centre, the adverse events that 
occurred there were more likely caused by diagnosis or prevention errors and effects of non 
invasive treatment. Other possible factors listed by the HMPS included non permanent doctors 
in the emergency centre, a high patient load, and a higher acuity of the patient population. (3) 
Similar to the HMPS, in the Australian study, emergency centre errors accounted for only 1.5% 
of the total errors reported, however, the emergency centre errors had the highest preventable 
errors proportion (82%). (13) For all three major studies, the majority of adverse events 
occurred in the emergency centres were due to diagnostic error, which more commonly led to 
disability and death. (3,4,12,13) The first report on error in emergency medicine specifically 
was published in 1999, where Robert Wears compared the magnitude of adverse events in 
emergency medicine to two airliner disasters every three days and called for a change from the 
traditional way that errors are discussed. (18) 
A study based on voluntary reporting in a busy emergency centre in the United States found an 
error rate of 18%, but an adverse event rate of only 0.36%. (9) The discrepancy in results when 
compared to the HMPS is most likely due to methodology used, but it is also worth noting that 
the authors mentioned that emergency centre patients were only in attendance for a short period 
of time, allowing less time for errors and subsequent adverse events to occur. The authors 
suspected that the study results were an underestimate of the true error and adverse event rates 
that occurred in the emergency centre. They had not questioned populations such as patients, 
cleaners, and radiographers in the study, and suspected that this, together with fear of liability 
and condemnation, may have led to under reporting of errors. (9) It is worth noting that patients 
in the study who were affected by errors were older, which may be an indication of the 
complexity of care involved in treating the elderly. (9) 
The above studies highlighted a few important facts. Firstly, that a large amount of death and 
disability occurs worldwide in every speciality due to errors and preventable adverse events. 
Secondly, a large number of adverse events that occur in emergency medicine are preventable. 
A glaring limitation in the above studies is that only admitted patients were studied, and errors 
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that may have occurred in the emergency centre involving patients that were discharged, were 
not included in the analysis.   
 
Adverse events in the emergency medical services 
The emergency medical services (EMS), especially in low-resourced settings, are fraught with 
time pressure, lack of resources, poor communication, an often acutely ill patient population, 
and multiple other stressors that may lead to adverse events. (6,19) There is a paucity of 
research into out of hospital patient safety, which currently tends to examine areas of 
information that is easy to obtain and analyse retrospectively). (6) There are various themes in 
adverse event reporting literature, which include air transport safety, ground vehicle safety, 
personnel safety, qualitative studies on provider perceptions of adverse events, and review of 
various triggers such as patient fatalities and out of hospital intubation.  While improved 
provider safety will obviously result in improved patient safety, we did not include specific 
studies regarding provider safety (including ground vehicle safety and prevention of collisions) 
in this literature review, as they do not bear much relevance to our study. Reasons to investigate 
adverse events in emergency medical services include identifying system and individual errors, 
mitigating risk, and improving future patient safety. (20) Various studies have attempted 
perform this in various ways.   
In Canada, MacDonald et al looked at the adverse events in an air ambulance programme 
reported via a mandatory adverse event reporting system.  This computerised system, known as 
the Decision Support Application, is a web-based portal which stakeholders can use to log 
inquiries, complaints, and adverse events. Adverse events in this case were not necessarily due 
to error, but included weather, aviation problems, and system difficulties.  Adverse events that 
did not result in harm were also included.  Over a four and half year period, the rate of adverse 
events was 11.53 for every 1,000 flights. This is much less than the rates reported by the in 
hospital studies.  Reporting bias may have led to decreased reports of adverse events in this 
study. The authors also noted another source of under reporting of errors that occurred during 
air transport but that went undetected.  They suggest that even if errors are detected at the 
receiving facility, they may not be attributed to the air transport, and will result in an even lower 
reporting rate. (20) Although the classification system used by the researchers did not specify 
the difference between individual and system failures, over one third of the adverse events 
leading to patient harm were clearly attributable to transport vehicle or equipment failures.  
Other errors such as communication and patient factors may also point to system errors rather 
than to individual errors.  The study also did not interrogate any recommendations or 
implementations resulting from these investigations or reports. (20) The secondary outcomes of 
the studies involved the demographics of the patients who sustained adverse events.  The 
number of males and females were nearly on par, and the two most common categories of cases 
	 12	
involved in adverse events were trauma and cardiac pathology.  Interestingly, although no 
mention was made in the text, the mean age that sustained adverse events was 44, and 
paediatrics was not included as a separate patient category. (20) In Germany, Hohenstein et al 
implemented a computer based Incident Reporting System (CIRS) which compassed of a 
voluntary, anonymous, web-based reporting system for adverse events. They advertised via 
emergency medicine congresses and journals, and requested anonymous reporting of adverse 
incidents. An expert committee then evaluated the reports, determined whether or not the report 
met criteria for one or more incident(s).(21) The study analysed 845 reports over a seven year 
period. Of the reports analysed, 91% of patients were over the age of 14, and the most frequent 
complaint was medical problems (50%), followed by trauma problems (25%). Individual staff 
error attributed 57% of the incidents, and system errors such as organisation and tactics and 
equipment contributed 36%. The remainder were classified as other cause or no incident. (21) 
The study’s advantage of anonymous reporting meant that a higher number of incidents were 
reported without fear of discipline or retribution; however, there were also additional concerns 
with voluntary reporting such as fictitious cases and competing commercial product companies 
trying to publish false reports about other company’s products. However, these were suspected 
to form a very small number, of the reported cases.  Other concerns with voluntary reporting 
include recall bias.  
A high proportion of incidents were associated with life threatening situations.  This may be due 
to either that more adverse events occurred during life threatening situations, or recall bias of 
life threatening situations – that potentially poor patient outcomes triggered the reporting of the 
incident.  Another disadvantage of the voluntary reporting system is that latent errors may have 
been undetected. Due to the anonymous nature of the reporting, not only is a full investigation 
and root cause analysis impossible, but follow up to determine patient outcomes related to the 
adverse was also difficult. (21) Another interesting finding that the authors failed to comment 
on was that in only 23% of incidents did the person responsible for the incident actually enter 
the report themselves.(21) 
In Victoria, Melbourne, a special committee used road traffic fatalities as a trigger to identify 
preventable deaths and various errors. From 1992 to 2003, the committee reviewed all data 
related to patient care of road traffic accident fatalities by only including patients who died after 
the arrival of an ambulance. They then categorised the errors identified into five categories: 
system error; treatment/management error, error in technique, delay in diagnosis, and error in 
diagnosis.  Boyle et al reviewed all reports published by this committee, and noted an increase 
in the mean error rate over a 10-year period.  The average age of those who demised was 
between 41 and 45 years, and the gender distribution 70% male to 30% female. (22) During the 
first half of the study period, the system errors decreased in number, while individual errors of 
diagnosis, technique, and management increased. However, during the second half of the study 
period, there was an increase in both system and individual error, while individual errors in 
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management declined. (22) The authors seem to attribute the rise in errors to the introduction of 
advanced life support paramedics in 2000, but there is no additional evidence to substantiate 
this or to demonstrate causality. Of note, throughout the study period, there were increased error 
rates in the rural areas when compared with metropolitan areas. (20) There were multiple 
limitations to this study. The study used a retrospective analysis model based solely on 
published data of fatality, and therefore could not have extrapolated errors in this prehospital 
system as a whole. The study examined only road traffic accident victims, and no other patient 
categories, and also only focused on patients that died. Errors that resulted in no to mild patient 
harm, or even in disability, would have been missed. (22) 
 
Detection of adverse events in the emergency medical services  
Detection of adverse events is a challenge, and always has been - both historically and globally. 
The landmark HMPS, Utah and Colorado, and Quality in Australian Health Care studies used 
record review which is a time and resource consuming process when done well. (3,4,12,13) In 
our Western Cape setting, 10% of patient report forms are scanned monthly for errors that may 
result in either adverse events or near misses. Alternative strategies include clinical 
surveillance, direct observation, (19) observers at ward rounds, (23) and morbidity and 
mortality meetings (23). However, there would need to be a trigger to initiate these 
conversations about adverse events, either during ward rounds or at the morbidity and mortality 
meetings. Voluntary reporting is effective, accurate, less time and resource consuming, and 
doesn’t require a specific trigger other than detection of a potential event. (21) However, fear of 
stigma, liability, and perhaps even the effort involved to report an adverse event may result in 
severe under reporting.(24) Some studies used anonymous reporting tools in order to try to 
overcome this barrier. (24,25) A review of complaints and/or claims against a system is a 
simple, but limited, detection tool. Curka et al and Colwell et al identified many system and 
personal errors by examining complaints against EMS systems, although there were multiple 
limitations by the retrospective methodology used in the majority of cases. Even in affluent 
areas, patients and family members tend not to lodge formal complaints. (26,27) It is important 
to note that in under resourced areas, certain population groups may be less inclined to 
complain or to seek compensation for injury or damage. This may be due to cultural 
differences, illiteracy, or even a lack of knowledge about how to access reporting systems. 
Patterson et al, using a panel of experts, developed a complex adverse event detection 
framework for use in helicopter emergency medical services (HEMS), in which various 
documentation, operational, interventional and other triggers led to further investigation of the 
event. Further interrogation of each event aimed to describe proximal cause and ascribe 
severity to the event. (19) The committee’s agreed definition of adverse event included 
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situations in which potential harm could have occurred to the patient, and therefore cases with 
our definition of near miss would be included. (19) 
One very important reason for not identifying adverse events due to errors, as noted by Baylis 
in an article in the Journal of Clinical Ethics in 1997, is that adverse events are often due to 
multiple factors, and it is often difficult to distinguish whether in a series of events only one 
error led directly to harm. (28) This may also lead to under reporting, as the provider may not 
feel that the definition of adverse event may not explain the situation. A second reason for 
under reporting may be that the well-meaning clinician genuinely is concerned that disclosing 
or reporting the error may not have any benefit, and may actually lead to further harm (for 
example by undermining the patient’s faith in the medical system as a whole).(28) Some of the 
less well-intentioned reasons are recognisable. Examples include fear of litigation, loss of 
professional reputation, and undermining relationships with colleagues, all conspiring to the 
under reporting of errors and/or adverse events. (28) 
In emergency medicine particularly, despite the fact that (as already noted above) errors are 
likely to occur regularly, physicians, nurses, and EMS providers alike note a reluctance to 
report. In in a single centre survey, less than a quarter of providers who had committed an error 
in the past year had reported the error governing body or committee, or disclosed the error to the 
patient themselves. (29) There was no further questioning of the reasons for non-disclosure. 
(29) Fairbanks et al conducted a qualitative study to examine the perceptions of EMS providers 
regarding adverse events and near misses in prehospital care. (24) The methodology included an 
anonymous web-based adverse event reporting system linked to a popular online discussion 
board; semi structured interviews, and two focus group discussions. The respondents consisted 
of both career and volunteer EMS providers, ranging from basic to advanced life support 
providers. Altogether, 61 individual events were detected, of which 44% were near misses, and 
56% were adverse events. (24,25) The definitions used correspond with those above. In both the 
overall analysis as well as a subgroup concerning paediatrics, the theme of under reporting was 
repeated. (24,25) Of the 61 incidents detected, the respondents were questioned about reporting 
in only 21 cases. Of these, 43% were reported to a physician, 48% were reported to a 
supervisor, and none were reported to a patient.  These rates seem higher than the reporting 
rates of other studies. However, all of these incidents were “reported” in during the study, and 
so other unreported errors may not have been included in the final total. (24) It is interesting that 
the directly quoted statements (see box 1) seem to reflect a reluctance to report co-workers’ 
mistakes. In the German anonymous critical incident reporting system, however, only 23% of 
reports were entered by the person responsible for the incident. (21) Is it possible that the 
anonymity of the reporting system removes the fear of reporting co-workers’ errors? Some other 
reasons for under reporting that emerged include: a blame and shame culture, bravado and fear 
of failure, medico-legal concerns, antagonism and criticism – worsening with increasing 
seniority, and lack of understanding of the definitions of and differences between adverse 
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events, near misses, and errors.(21) 
 
Themes associated with errors included a lack of standardisation, antagonism between 
providers, and a blame culture. (24) In another qualitative study in 2009, the interviewees 
identified that patient safety and adverse events should examine more than just medication 
errors and vehicle collisions. (30) Interestingly, 75% of participants identified clinical 
judgement (including recall and the processing of complex clinical information) as being the 
key issue in patient safety. Training inadequacy was noted as a significant factor, and non-
transport of patients was another key issue in patient safety. The participants did relate patient 
non-transport to both clinical judgement and training. (30) The article was poorly written, not 
well referenced, and included only a small sample of 18 participants. The researchers 
specifically asked the participants (predominantly EMS providers from Canada) about 
medication errors.  Once again, the concern emerged that medication errors are seldom reported. 
(30) Reasons given for under reporting of medication errors included fear of liability, but also 
that, errors go unnoticed, errors are not recorded, and EMS providers from multiple agencies do 
not feel that they are part of an overall system. (30) 
Curka et al and Colwell et al examined complaints against EMS systems in the United States by 
retrospective review. (26,27) Both studies had some limitations, such as the data was limited to 
complaints filed previously, and in the Colwell study the medical director of the service in 
question had summarised the complaints for two of the years, which may have led to bias. (27) 
Another limitation of both studies is, once again, was under reporting. Despite errors, 
dissatisfied patients and family members, the authors suspected that the majority did not lodge 
formal complaints. (19,20) While the authors did not use the terms adverse event or error 
specifically, complaints are an important trigger tool for identifying potential errors that were 
made while the patient was under EMS care. Complaints highlighted personal errors in 
judgement, driving skills, non-transport decisions, and medical care, as well as system errors in 
response times, loss of personal belongings, and billing queries. No comment was made as if 
errors were found to be present by further investigation, or if adverse events had arisen from the 
noted errors made. (26,27) The authors of the Colwell study noted that the majority of 
complaints were initiated by the patients themselves, with less complaints originating from 
other medical personnel, and still less from patient family members. In the Curka study, most 
Box 1: Some direct quotes from EMS providers: 
- “The job is an adverse event”, (24)  
- “Some ambulance corps are so small that no one gets fired, so reporting errors 
doesn’t matter.”(25)  
- “You don’t want to rat on friends and you want to save your own ass as 
well”.(25) 
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complaints were initiated by family members of patients, or the patients themselves, with very 
few complaints originating from other medical personnel. The majority of complaints related to 
the provider/patient relationship, with 25% of total complaints (Cowell) and 34% of complaints 
(Curka) resulting from rude or unprofessional behaviour. (26,27) 
Another high-yield area where adverse events and errors may occur is when patients are not 
transported to hospital. In a small US study examining a single city-wide EMS system for one 
month only, in almost half (47.8%) of all cases in which EMS contact was made, the patient 
was not transported to hospital. (31) This included both patients who refused transport 
themselves, as well as cases in which the EMS refused to transport a patient .With no 
statistically significant differences between the two groups, more than half (55.5%) of the 
patients in both groups later sought additional medical attention. (31) Zachariah et al 
retrospectively reviewed patients who had either refused or been denied transport to hospital, 
and found that in 64.5% of cases that were followed up, the patients sought further medical 
attention. (32) Burnstein et al prospectively enrolled consequent patients who refused transport 
to hospital and reviewed them telephonically. Follow up was possible in only 62% of cases, and 
of these, 48% of patients subsequently sought medical attention and 6% were admitted to 
hospital. (33) Both follow up bias and observer bias were suspected in this study, and due to the 
low follow up rate it is possible that the actual number of subsequent admissions was greater 
than reported. The authors concluded that where possible, every attempt should be made to 
transport patients who have contacted an EMS service for assistance, to formal medical care. 
(33) 
Bigham et al performed a systematic review of all literature relating to prehospital adverse 
events and patient safety between 1999 and 2011. They included 88 papers in the final review, 
of which 16 related predominantly to field intubation. From the beginning, due to the large 
amount of literature available on prehospital intubation, it was decided to include intubation as a 
stand-alone theme. (6) Prehospital intubation is an area fraught with error and adverse events 
and is therefore a good trigger for the identification of adverse events within the emergency 
medical services.  An unrecognised non-tracheal intubation (into either the pharynx or 
oesophagus) may be fatal and counted as an entirely preventable death.(34) Intubation is 
associated with an increased morbidity and possibly mortality in both adult (35) and paediatric 
(36–38) patients. Non-tracheal intubation; including tube placement above the vocal cords or 
misplacement in the oesophagus but excluding mainstem bronchus placement  ranges from 2% 
to 25%. (34,39–42)  
Even in cases where an endotracheal intubation attempt resulted in a successful intubation, the 
incidence of error, resulting in both near misses and adverse events, may be marked. Dunford et 
al, as a subset of the San Diego Paramedic RSI trial that was conducted between 1998 and 2002, 
analysed the incidence of desaturation (defined as a decreased in SPO2 as measured by pulse 
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oximetry to less than 90% from a baseline greater than or equal to 90%, or any decrease from a 
baseline SPO2 of less than 90%) and pulse rate reactivity (an increase or decrease in the pulse 
rate of more than 20 beats per minute) during 54 pre - hospital rapid sequence intubations. (41) 
Of these, 31 (57%) of these cases showed evidence of desaturation during the rapid sequence 
intubation procedure, including 11 (36%) that developed a bradycardia of less than 60 heart 
beats per minute. What is of even more concern is that in 86% of the cases where desaturation 
occurred, the intubation was rated as easy by the intubating paramedic. (41) Wang et al 
evaluated the Pre-hospital Airway Collaborative Evaluation, Phase II (PACE II) data.  (39,43)  
This was a large, prospective, observational study, involving feedback forms from 42 advanced 
life support EMS paramedics in Pennsylvania. Unfortunately, as noted by the authors, the study 
was based on self-reported data, and they expected the error rate to be higher than actually 
reported by the study. There was a returned data rate of only 68% (reflected by the returned data 
forms compared with the recorded number of intubations by computers at each service). (43) 
The results of the returned data forms showed an error rate of 22%. These errors included tube 
misplacement or dislodgement of 3%, failed intubation in 15%, and multiple intubation attempts 
in 3%. They later compared the data against registries such as the Pennsylvania death registry, 
in order to determine outcomes in these cases. Overall, the mortality rate of all reported patients 
who had attempts at endotracheal intubation was as high as 73%, of which in 60% of cases the 
patient was already in cardiac arrest (which most likely contributed to the poor outcomes.) Once 
the cases of cardiac arrest were corrected for, there was no statistically significant difference in 
the mortality outcomes of cases with intubation errors versus those cases in which no error was 
detected. However, the study shows that both error rates and adverse events were high in cases 
with prehospital endotracheal tube intubation. (39,43) In our Cape Town setting, Sobuwa et al 
evaluated prehospital intubations in 124 patients with traumatic injuries, and found a 
statistically significant improvement in outcome in patients managed with basic facemask 
ventilation over higher risk endotracheal intubation attempts. (44) The literature and argument is 
not clear as to whether pre-hospital intubation should be avoided, or whether better training 
should be implemented – however, it is clear that it is a high-risk area where adverse events 
should be identified and studied.  
It is worth noting that paediatrics seems to be an area where proportionally more adverse events 
are reported, compared to other patient populations. In the qualitative Cushman et al study 
mentioned above on adverse events in EMS, 20% of cases mentioned by providers related to 
children which is substantially more than than the 12% of paediatric cases transported by that 
EMS system during that period. (25) Authors suspected that this may be attributed to either 
recall bias or due to the relative importance of paediatric adverse events to providers. (25) Two 
major themes emerged related to adverse events in paediatrics:(25) 
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1. That children are different; not only did providers report increased stress and discomfort 
when treating paediatric patients, but errors of omission were more common due to an 
increased hesitancy to act. 
2. The providers noted limited training and experience in treating paediatric patients.  
In a recently published qualitative study on prehospital paediatric airway management, 
providers noted paediatric airway management as the most likely event that led to patient safety 
problems. Lack of experience was rated by 75% of participants as highly likely to lead to patient 
safety issues. (38) The study was based on a three phase Delphi survey, including emergency 
physicians, advanced and basic life support paramedical practitioners.  (38) Hatherill et al 
studied interfacility paediatric transfers to a Paediatric Intensive Care Unit (PICU) in a low 
resourced setting over one year, and found an unacceptably high rate of technical (lack of 
monitoring, intravenous access or a dislodged/misplaced endotracheal tube), clinical (shock, 
hypoxia, or hypoglycaemia), and critical (need for emergency intubation upon arrival to the 
PICU, cardiac, cardio-respiratory, or respiratory arrest during the transfer) adverse events. One 
or more technical adverse events occurred in 36% of children, one or more clinical adverse 
event occurred in 27% of children, and one or more critical adverse event occurred in 9% of 
children studied. (45) notwithstanding the challenges in directly comparing rates across studies, 
when compared to the HMPS (3,12) these adverse events detected seem significant by 
suggesting that adverse events are more likely to occur in low resourced and out of hospital 
settings, and especially in paediatric cases. (45)  
Overall, detection of adverse events is a challenge and multiple qualitative studies identified 
that a large proportion of adverse events and errors went unreported. Prehospital intubation, 
paediatrics, fatalities, and non-transport cases may be used as proxies to identify adverse events 




There is very little information in the literature regarding what recommendations are made from 
the information gathered when adverse events and error is identified. Fairbanks et al 
recommend a systems approach and noted that EMS providers expressed a desire for a non-
punitive approach. (24) In the Canadian qualitative study, EMS providers requested more 
training, and suggested that changes be made at system level in order to decrease the amounts of 
errors, near misses, and adverse events that occurred. (30) Recommendations were also made 
for an aggressive educational and quality assurance programmes as well as for a follow up 
study. (42) 
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In Hatherill’s study, less adverse events occurred when transfers were undertaken by Paediatric 
Intensive Care Unit (PICU) staff. A comparison between transfers undertaken by PICU staff 
and non-PICU staff was not possible, but the results seem to suggest that a specialised 
paediatric retrieval service would be indicated in a low resourced setting.  (45) 
Limitations 
Very few of the studies included in the literature review were from low and middle income 
resourced cities. There is a paucity in the literature regarding adverse events in low and middle 
income settings.  
Conclusion 
Preventable adverse events due to error occur regularly in health care. The incidence of error 
may be even more marked in emergency medicine and out of hospital care, but errors are 
difficult to detect, and investigate further.  In low resourced settings, the detection of adverse 
events is even more challenging. Interrogation of complaints, patient report form and medical 
records review, various triggers such as non-transport, airway management, and paediatrics may 
be high yield areas to detect adverse events. Near misses should also be included for analysis, 
because as we detect more errors, we can implement more recommendations to prevent or 
mitigate the risk from these errors in the future.  
To the best of our knowledge, this will be the first study in a low resourced setting to investigate 
an adverse events registry that was configured by various methods for error detection (self-
reporting, complaints, patient report forms review). This will also be the first study to analyse 
the recommendations made by a committee and investigate the nature of the recommendations 
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A DESCRIPTION OF REPORTED ADVERSE EVENTS FROM THE PUBLIC 




Out of hospital emergency medical service patients present unique challenges and ample 
opportunities for medical error to occur. Identifying medical error is important for mitigating 
future risk and improving patient safety. 
Hypothesis/problem 
Our study describes the adverse event registry of an emergency medical service  system in a low 
resource setting over a six-year period.  
Methods 
The Western Cape Emergency Medical Services Adverse Event Registry were reviewed for the 
period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2015.  From these, all cases classified as an adverse 
event or near miss were extracted for in depth review. Demographics, type of error, and types of 
recommendations implemented are reported.   
Results 
Altogether 106 (69%) adverse events and 47 (31%) near misses were reported over the six-year 
period. The mean age of patients was 31 years (standard deviation ±24.8). Of these 65 (42%) 
cases were adult medical patients, 31 (20%) adult trauma patients, 15 (10%) obstetric patients 
and 42 (27%) paediatric patients. The caseload was observed to increase over the six-year 
period, whilst system medical errors decreased and individual medical errors increased over the 
same period. 
Conclusion 
In this low resource emergency medical service system, individual medical errors increased and 
system medical errors decreased as more recommendations derived from adverse events caused 
by the system errors were implemented. This created a greater need for individual and group 
training of EMS clinical providers. We recommend further research in order to adequate 
describe the reason for the increase individual medical error, as well as to find more effective 
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Primum non nocere (first do no harm) is one of the maxims on which our medical care system is 
built. Preventable adverse events are by their definition due to medical error. (1) Medical errors 
result in increased cost, complaints, patient morbidity, and mortality to the extent that it has 
been estimated to be the third leading cause of death in the United States.(2–6) Emergency 
medicine, and out of hospital emergency care in particular, present unique challenges that 
increase the risk for medical error to occur. (7–12) Higher rates of preventable medical error 
result in more adverse events and near misses and this is fairly well documented in Western 
literature. In contrast, in low resourced settings, literature on adverse events is limited to 
medical records review and single centre studies. (11, 13)   
Reducing medical error is complex. Not only are worsened patient outcomes often the result of 
multiple types of medical errors, including latent errors, but the outcomes are also often 
incorrectly ascribed to the severity of the underlying disease. (14,15) Unfortunately most 
medical errors remain under reported and not highlighted, spoken about, or investigated further 
(sometimes even when detected). Possible reasons for the under reporting include recall bias, 
fear of litigation action, potential loss of health care workers’ professional reputation, fear of 
undermining relationships with colleagues (or getting others into trouble), and a blame and 
shame culture that is still prevalent in many organisations. (15–18)   
It is reasonable to argue that error in low resourced settings is at least on par with (and possibly 
higher than) what is reported in the more robust data collections reported in western literature.  
In depth analysis of errors may assist in preventing similar errors from re-occurring through 
structured risk management. This study aimed to describe the adverse event registry records of 
the public emergency medical service in the Western Cape, South Africa by focusing on 
medical error, adverse events, near misses and recommendations made over a six-year period. 
 
Methods 
Records review of the Emergency Medical Services Adverse Event Registry (Department of 
Health, Western Cape Government, South Africa) was conducted for the period 1 January 2010 
to 31 December 2015. The study followed the Strengthening the Reporting of Observational 
Studies in Epidemiology (STROBE) checklist to report its findings. (19)  Terminology used 
throughout this study is defined in Box 1 
 
Box 1. Definitions of terminology used 
Error: The failure of a planned action to be completed as intended or the use of an incorrect 
	 27	
plan to achieve an aim. (18) 
Adverse event: An injury resulting from a medical intervention, rather than the patient’s 
underlying condition. (20)  
Patient Safety: the reduction of risk of unnecessary harm associated with healthcare to an 
acceptable minimum.  
Harmful incident (adverse event): an incident that resulted in harm to a patient. (31)  
Near miss: an incident that did not result in the harm to a patient. (31)  
Latent error: An error whose adverse consequences may lie dormant within the system for a 
long time, only becoming evidence when they combine with other factors to breach the 
system’s defences. (18)  
Cognitive error: An error in the process of thinking (18)   
Affective error: An error when there is an inordinate intrusion of affect into the decision-
making process that results in a poor decision and may lead to a poor outcome. (18)  
System:  set of interdependent components interacting to achieve a common aim. These 
components may be classified in various ways: sociographic factors include national, 
organisational/institutional, health-care provider, and patient/family. (18) 
 
Study setting and population 
The Western Cape Emergency Medical Services (EMS) serve a population of 5.8 million 
people, covering an area of 129,462 square kilometres (roughly the size of Alabama).  
Approximately 170 ambulances are deployed daily across the province. The Emergency 
Medical Services also provide planned patient transport, disaster medicine, rescue, and 
aeromedical retrieval services. There are on average 640,000 requests for an ambulance transfer 
per year, and, of these, approximately 520,000 patient transports per year. The main reasons for 
non-transport include patients declining transport and delays in response times. The Emergency 
Medical Services consists of three levels of out-of-hospital care: Basic life support practitioners 
provide basic care including oxygen; intermediate level practitioners provide a higher level of 
care including intravenous access and administration of various drugs; and advanced life 
support paramedics perform advanced cardiac life support, advanced airway management (rapid 
sequence induction and endotracheal intubation), and advanced trauma and paediatric life 
support. An additional advanced life support staffed specialised paediatric retrieval service was 
introduced in 2011. 
The Western Cape Emergency Medical Services Adverse Event Registry was established in 
January 2009, in order to record all cases investigated by the service’s quality assurance 
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committee. Cases included in the register are identified by means of complaints from patients, 
family members, members of the public, hospital medical staff, self-reporting by Emergency 
Medical Services staff, and random screening of the patient report form (the document 
completed by emergency care providers for each transfer). The quality assurance committee is 
made up by the chair (an emergency physician) and four, regional quality assurance managers 
(all advanced life support paramedics with training and experience in quality assurance). The 
quality assurance committee investigates every reported incident, through review of the 
documentation associated with the incident.  This may include reviewing patient report forms, 
logbooks, daily checklists, radio communication log, formal written statements from persons 
involved, and all computerised records (e.g. vehicle tracking and mission times). An 
investigation report is then compiled and once completed is sent for peer review. The 
classification of the medical error (), and whether or not patient harm occurred is made through 
a consensus decision by the committee.  Depending on the nature of the classification, remedial 
recommendations are made to involved parties. These may include system improvements and/ 
or individual or group retraining of practitioners. When intentional individual error was 
suspected, the incident is referred to a senior operational committee for an independent 
disciplinary investigation. All investigation variables are logged electronically into the registry, 
including: date of incident, demographics and incident detail, classification of the medical error 
(individual, system, neither, or both), if the incident qualified as an adverse event or near miss 
as well as the recommendations made.  The quality assurance committee provides formal 
feedback to the complainant and all relevant individuals affected by the outcome.  
Sampling, data collection and management 
The Western Cape Emergency Medical Services Adverse Event Registry were reviewed for the 
period 1 January 2010 to 31 December 2015.  From these, all cases classified as an adverse 
event or near miss were extracted for in depth review.  For cases not clearly classified as an 
adverse event or near miss, a quality assurance committee member was approached for a 
decision.  Cases not classified as an adverse event or near miss were excluded along with any 
cases with missing data (Figure 1).  We reviewed all the case records of incidents, as well as the 
respective supporting documents. The objective of the additional records review was to obtain 
additional information that may not have been that apparent in the registry summery. Study data 
were captured on an Excel spreadsheet (Microsoft Office, Redmond, USA). Complainant, 
patient and staff identifiers were removed from the data sample. The study was approved by the 
University of Cape Town Health and Research Ethics Committee (ref no: 361/2015).  
Data Analysis 
An overall count of all cases entered into the study database was conducted initially, followed 
by the use of descriptive statistics to describe the categorical data, whether binary (male/female) 
or nominal (level of practitioner). Categorical variables were summarised using frequencies and 
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percentages. For percentage calculations, the denominator used was the overall count of cases 
analysed, or the total counted per category. Dates and times of day were analysed as ordinal 
categorical data, and the information was reported with the use of frequency tables and 
histograms. Continuous data was expressed as mean and standard deviation (SD). The data were 
analysed using Dell Statistica version 13 (Dell Software, Aliso Viejo, California, USA).  
 
Results 
The recruitment process for the sample of 153 cases is described in Figure 1. Table 1 reflects 
the demographics of the adverse event and near miss cases. The high proportion of unknown 
paediatric gender cases (10, 84%) can be attributed to neonatal cases where the gender was not 
recorded. The highest proportion of cases was facilitated by intermediate life support level 
practitioners (66, 43%) (Table 1).  
 
 
Figure 1. Sampling and data collection. 
 
	 	




52 cases excluded 
(did not meet 
AE/NM criteria)
158 cases
5 cases excluded 
(incomplete 
investigation) 
153 cases included in 
analysis 
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Table 1. Demographics of adverse events and near misses reported from 2010 to 2015 
		 Total Medical Trauma Obstetric Paediatric 
Total (n) 153 65 31 15 42 
Mean age (SD)   53 (25) 36 (15) 25 (8) 1 (2) 
Gender: 
M 69 31(45%) 23 (33%) 0 15 (22%) 
F 72 33(46%)  7 (10%) 15 (21%) 17 (23%) 




Advanced 53 17 (32%) 11 (21%) 5 (9%) 20 (38%) 
Intermediate 66 31 (47%) 18 (27%) 4 (6%) 13 (20%) 
Basic 24 14 (59%) 1 (4%) 2 (8%) 7 (29%) 
Unknown 10 3 (30%) 1 (10%) 4 (40%) 2 (20%) 
Day of 
transfer: 
Weekday 109 42 (39%) 19 (17%) 13 (12%) 35 (32%) 
Weekend 42 22 (52%) 12 (29%) 2 (5%) 6 (14%) 
Unknown2 2 1 (50%) 0 0 1 (50%) 
Time of 
transfer: 
Working hours 76 37 (49%) 13 (17%) 6 (8%) 20 (26%) 
After hours 75 28 (37%) 18 (24%) 9 (12%) 20 (27%) 
Unknown2 2 0 0 0 2 (100%) 
1 In 1 case, multiple casualties were involved, with no investigation into demographics.  
2 In 2 cases, the time of day/day of the week was not noted.  
 
Altogether 106 (69%) adverse events and 47 (31%) near misses were reported over the six-year 
period (Figure 2). Thirty-five (23%) cases were investigated in 2015, the highest number of any 
year. The lowest number of cases was investigated in 2010 (17, 11%). The adverse events 
increased in a linear trend from 2010 to 2015. The near misses remained static over the same 
period. The system error linear trend decreased from 2010 to 2015 (Figure 3). Both individual 
cognitive errors with, and without intent, increased over the same period. Only three (2%) of 
153 cases were affective errors detected.  
Recommendations pertaining to EMS operational and clinical system changes, including the use 
of new or amended standard operating procedures, decreased slightly (Figure 4). Outcomes that 
recommended individual retraining of clinical practitioners formed the majority of 
recommendations and remained mostly static, while there was an increase in recommendations 
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A key finding of this study is that adverse event reporting increased over the study period.  The 
fact that the least number of cases was reported in 2010, and the most in 2015, can likely be 
attributed to the quality assurance system becoming more rigorous in detecting new cases as it 
matured; the EMS adverse event registry was initiated in 2009, and underwent considerable 
development over its first seven years. Improved case screening by quality assurance regional 
managers, more self-reporting of potential medical errors by clinical staff, improved access for 
patients and families to report suspected medical error cases, and increased emphasis on 
medical error reporting, all may have contributed to the evolving culture of improved patient 
safety. The perception that bad patient injury outcomes prompted complaints from patients and 
their families may explain the higher detection rates of adverse events over near misses. 
However, this finding contrasts with the results of a German adverse incident reporting system, 
in which only 27% of reported cases had proven harm to the patient as a result of the incident. 
(16)  
The face that system medical errors decreased and individual medical errors increased may 
relate to multiple factors. A Canadian study that predominantly examined air transport adverse 
events found that over a third of errors were attributed to system failures (including equipment 
and transport vehicle failures), which aligns well with our study’s findings. (14) However, an 
Australian study reported that 54% of incidents (including both adverse events and near misses) 
were caused by system factors, which is higher than in our setting. (19) The decrease in system 
errors over the study period is most likely attributed to the implementation of improved standard 
operating procedures, based on recommendations, as a result of the errors detected in the earlier 
years. In our study, 62% of the cases caused by individual medical errors compares well to the 
56% in the German study, but is greater than the 42% of adverse events caused by human 
factors in the Australian air transport adverse events study, or the 21.3% of adverse events 
attributed to individual medical errors in a Canadian air transport adverse events study. 
(12,14,19) Individual medical errors, both intentional and non-intentional, increased over the 
six-year study period, while system medical errors decreased. The German study did not analyse 
the trends over their seven-year study period. (16) However, the Australian study investigated 
medical errors in an EMS system by examining road traffic accident fatalities and found that 
over a 10-year period, the individual errors increased, while system errors first decreased and 
then increased. Their researchers attributed the increase in individual errors to the 
implementation of an advanced life support paramedic structure, although there was no 
evidence to prove this. (20) It is also possible that more individual errors were identified by the 
paramedics, or that this was simply a coincidence.  In our study, the reported adverse events and 
near misses occurred in cases with advanced, intermediate, and basic life support crews. In fact, 
the majority of cases reported occurred during transfers facilitated by intermediate level clinical 
providers. However, Western Cape EMS logistical data shows that intermediate life support 
	 35	
crews transported most of the patient cases triaged as priority 1 indicating a higher acuity of 
patient illness. This may have created a mismatch between the acuity of the patient and the 
required resources, and increased the potential for medical error to occur. The mismatch may be 
explained by the low resourced system not producing and/or employing sufficient numbers of 
advanced life support paramedic crew to facilitate the transfer of patients. In the authors’ 
opinion, increased and improved reporting caused the increased medical error rate noted. 
In this study, the majority of recommendations made by the quality assurance committee 
involved re-training of clinical and operational staff.   The recommendations for increased 
training within the entire EMS system, increased over the six-year period, corresponding with 
the increase in individual medical errors over that period.  
 
Limitations 
No adverse event reporting system will ever fully detect all medical errors. (24,28,29) We too 
suspect a degree of under reporting, mainly because of the small ratio of reported cases 
compared to the large number of patients transported by EMS over the study period Baylis et al 
noted that that well-meaning practitioners are often not able to identify that a medical error 
resulted in a particular adverse patient outcome and therefore underestimate the benefits of 
incident reporting. (15) Self reporting would be a far more accurate means of detecting adverse 
events, however, very few practitioners self-report. (15,21,22) Improved patient safety 
awareness and education campaigns on the benefits of self-reporting whenever medical error is 
suspected may change the current silence culture. Low resourced setting EMS quality assurance 
systems should focus their efforts on the detection of medical errors that may occur during high 
risk patient transfers to extract maximum yield. Examples include cases where patients are 
discharged on scene by EMS clinicians and therefore not transported, advanced airway 
management cases, and all paediatric and obstetric transfers. (21,23–30) Intensive record review 
of these high-risk cases may improve medical error detection.  
 
Conclusion 
In the low resource EMS system, individual medial errors increased and system medical errors 
decreased as more recommendations derived from adverse events caused by the system errors 
were implemented. This created a greater need for individual and group training of EMS clinical 
providers. Further research is recommended in order to investigate the reasons for the increase 
in individual medical errors, as well as how to improve methods of adequately detecting errors 
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